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Alexander Gazikas

The Low Water Mark for Beach Access: Defending
Government Protection of Intertidal Recreation as a
Lawful Exercise of State Power
17 U.N.H. L. Rev. 287 (2019)

A B S T R A C T . Beaches are a natural resource ideally suited for public recreation. The public
generally has a right to access this intertidal land, but the purpose and scope of public access vary
greatly between states. Consistent with national trends toward greater public access, the
legislatures of Massachusetts and Maine have attempted to expand public beach access rights to
include the right to engage in general recreation below the mean high tide line. However, the
Supreme Judicial Courts of both states have declared that such legislation would be an
unconstitutional taking of property requiring compensation to the abutting landowners and held
that public rights of access are limited to the traditional purposes of fishing, fowling, and
navigation. In doing so, the high courts of both states stymied a natural progression toward
greater public intertidal rights based on a colonial city ordinance enacted in 1641. I argue that
legislative determinations about the most socially valuable uses of intertidal land should be given
significant weight, particularly in light of the inherent flexibility of public access rights and a
national trend expanding beach access. Thus, in this Article, I argue that the state legislatures can
broaden the public’s right to beach access without constituting a taking. In doing so, the Article
provides a roadmap for how legislatures, including those in Massachusetts and Maine, can draft
legislation broadening beach access rights that can withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Associate, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, Washington, D.C.; J.D. Harvard Law
School; B.A., University of Connecticut. I am grateful to Joe Singer, Angela Howe, and Staley Prom
for their valuable input. I am also grateful to my family and friends for their willingness to indulge
me in extensive and helpful conversations.
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I N T R OD U C T I ON

The public has long enjoyed an inherent right to access and use the intertidal
zone, the land between the low and high tides. However, the public’s beach access
needs have evolved in the hundreds of years since these rights were initially
established. Modern courts and legislatures have responded by expanding the
purposes for which the public may access the beach and the area of beach to which
it has access. Despite this national trend, the courts of Massachusetts and Maine
have drastically limited the public’s beach access rights. There, the public may only
access the intertidal land for the traditional purposes of fishing, fowling, and
navigation.
The Massachusetts and Maine legislatures have both attempted to broaden the
public’s rights to include general recreation, but the Supreme Judicial Courts of
both states have declared that such legislation would be an unconstitutional taking
of property requiring compensation to the abutting landowners. I argue that courts
should defer to legislative determinations about the most socially valuable uses of
intertidal land, particularly in light of the inherent flexibility of public access rights
and a national trend expanding beach access. Thus, in this Article, I argue that the
state legislatures could grant this recreational right of access without constituting
a taking.
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I.

MA I N E , MA S S A C H U S E T T S , A N D T H E C OL ONI A L OR D I N A N C E

At English common law, the land between the high and low tide lines was held
by the Crown for the benefit of the public.1 This land was held as two associated
classes of rights: the jus privatum, the private right, and the jus publicum, the public
right.2 The jus publicum provided the citizens the right to access the seashore for
socially valuable purposes such as fishing and navigation.3 While the private right
in the property was alienable, the public right remained impressed upon the land
even after it had been transferred.4
Following the American Revolution, the intertidal land passed from the Crown
to the colonies, and then to the states, still encumbered by these public rights.5 The
states therefore possessed all land below the high tide line and held it subject to an
inalienable requirement that it be used for the benefit of the public.6
Today, the public’s right of access to the shoreline varies across states. Hawaii
allows for the public use of land above the high tide line, extending to all dry sand.7
New Jersey requires that the public be given reasonable access to the shoreline,
which could include allowing access over private property.8 Most coastal states
recognize a right to engage in recreation on whatever land is available.9
Despite the general trend in favor of broad recreational beach access, two states

1

Timothy M. Mulvaney & Brian Weeks, “Waterlocked”: Public Access to New Jersey’s Coastline, 34
Ecology L.Q. 579, 582–84 (2007) (citing Justinian I, The Institutes of Justinian with English
Introduction, Translation, and Notes 91 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th ed. 1941)). For a
detailed account of the public trust doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
2

Jose L. Fernandez, Untwisting the Common Law: Public Trust and the Massachusetts Colonial
Ordinance, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 623, 627 (1998).

3

Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 582.

4

Id. at 583–84.

5

Fernandez, supra note 2, at 629; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473
(1988) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894)) (“Upon the American Revolution, these rights,
charged with a like trust, were vested in the original States within their respective borders . . . .”).
6

Fernandez, supra note 2, at 624.

7

In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968).

8

Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 365 (N.J. 1984).

9

Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana
28 v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 451 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009); Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 73 (Mich. 2005);
Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780
S.E.2d 187, 194 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015); Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, 1997 WL 1098081, at *9
(R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 1997); Movrich v. Lobermeier, 889 N.W.2d 454, 465 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016).
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have retained unusually restrictive approaches to public access.10 Massachusetts
and Maine have extended private ownership to include the intertidal land and allow
public access only for the purposes of fishing, fowling, and navigation.11 This
anomaly has historical roots in Massachusetts that predate the creation of the
United States.12
Following the English tradition, private land ownership in colonial
Massachusetts originally extended only to the high tide line while everything below
that line was owned by the colony for the benefit of the public.13 The public’s right
to use this land was codified by a Massachusetts Bay Colony city ordinance in 1641,
which granted the public the right to “free fishing and fowling in any great ponds,
bays, coves, and rivers, so far as the sea ebbs and flows . . . .”14
However, the colony needed shipping wharves and could not afford to build
them with public funds.15 In order to incentivize private wharf construction, the
ordinance was amended in 164716 to grant the intertidal land to abutting
landowners, with the hopes that they would build wharves themselves on their
newly acquired land.17 The 1647 amendment thus extended private ownership from
the average high tide line to the average low tide line while retaining the public’s
access rights for fishing, fowling, and navigation.18
That ordinance was soon annulled, but it resurfaced 150 years later in Storer v.
Freeman.19 Chief Justice Parsons stated that although the ordinance was no longer
in effect, “a usage has prevailed, which now has force as our common law, that the
owner of lands bounded on the sea . . . shall hold [title] to [the] low water mark . . .

10

See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 172 (Me. 1989); Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438
(1810).
11

See Bell, 557 A.2d at 172; Storer, 6 Mass. at 438.

12

See Bell, 557 A.2d at 172; Storer, 6 Mass. at 438.

13

Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 124 (Mass. 1909); Commonwealth v.
Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 66 (1851); Storer, 6 Mass. at 438.
14

Alger, 61 Mass. at 67.

15

Storer, 6 Mass. at 438.

16

See Alger, 61 Mass. at 67–68 (noting new provisions were “probably passed” in 1647); see also
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 565 (Mass. 1974) (“This was accomplished by what has
become known as the colonial ordinance of 1641–47, which is found in the 1649 codification.”). See
generally Storer, 6 Mass. at 438.
17

See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 565; Alger, 61 Mass. at 68.

18

Alger, 61 Mass. at 67–70.

19

Storer, 6 Mass. at 438.
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.”20 Further, “[a]lthough strictly the ordinance was limited to the area of
Massachusetts Bay Colony, it has long been interpreted as effecting a grant of the
tidal land to all coastal owners in the Commonwealth.”21 Therefore, private owners
along the entire coast of Massachusetts possessed title to the intertidal land.22
This ordinance has since become the final word on Massachusetts beach
access.23 In 1974, in an attempt to bring Massachusetts into conformity with the
general trend of other coastal states, the Massachusetts House of Representatives
proposed legislation expanding public access.24 The proposed act would have
granted a “public on-foot free right-of-passage up to the mean high water line,”
subject to certain restrictions.25 It therefore expanded the uses of the public trust
property beyond the traditional categories of fishing, fowling, and navigation.
The House requested an advisory opinion from the Supreme Judicial Court
(SJC)26 as to whether the proposed bill would be an unconstitutional taking of
private property without just compensation.27 The SJC framed its inquiry around
the 1647 ordinance amendment.28 The court stated that to satisfy the Constitution,
the right-of-way had to be a “natural derivative” of the public’s existing access
rights.29 The court found that an on-foot right-of-passage was not “reasonably
related” to the exercise of the rights granted in the ordinance.30 The court therefore
held that the proposed Act would be a taking of private property requiring just
compensation as a categorical “permanent physical intrusion.”31

20

Id.

21

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566 (citing Weston v. Sampson, 8 Cush. 347, 353–54 (1851)).

22

Id.

23

Alger, 61 Mass. at 69-70; Barker v. Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255, 258 (1832); see Opinion of the
Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566 (citing Weston, 8 Cush. at 353–54).
24

See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 563.

25

Id. at 564. The right-of-way was not available before sunrise or after sunset, in areas protected
by the Department of Natural Resources, or where there was a structure, enclosure, or other
improvement. Id.

26

Both Maine and Massachusetts refer to their highest court as “Supreme Judicial Court.” Bell
v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989); Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435 (1810).

27

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 565, 568.

28

See id. at 566.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 566, 568.

31

Id. at 568.
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The 1647 ordinance has similar controlling authority in Maine.32 In 1986,
Maine’s legislature passed The Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act.33 The Act
provided a right of access to “use intertidal land for recreation” and granted “any
other trust rights to use intertidal land recognized by the Maine common law . . . .”34
In a holding that scholars have found anomalous,35 the Maine SJC invalidated the
statute and upheld a private owner’s quiet title action to an area of beachfront.36 The
court analyzed the statute in light of the 1647 ordinance and heavily relied upon the
Massachusetts SJC advisory opinion.37
Both states’ legislatures have thus attempted to expand public beach access
rights to allow uses beyond fishing, fowling, and navigation.38 At the same time,
most coastal states had already broadened public access rights beyond the
traditional categories.39 Some states went further and expanded the public’s access
rights to land above the high tide line.40 Despite this trend across the West Coast,41

32

Maine was once part of Massachusetts but separated in 1820. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d
168, 172 (Me. 1989). The Massachusetts Act of Separation stated: “[a]ll Grants of land . . . which
have been . . . made by the said Commonwealth [of Massachusetts], before the separation of said
District [of Maine] shall take place, and having . . . effect within the said district, shall continue in
full force . . . .” Id. (citing Massachusetts Act of Separation, Mass. Laws 1819, ch. 161, § 1 Seventh).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine thus incorporated the ordinance into Maine common law.
Lapish v. President of the Bangor Bank, 8 Me. 85, 93 (1831).
33

1985 Me. Laws 782 (codified as amended at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12, § 573 (2018)); Bell, 557 A.2d
at 176.
34

1985 Me. Laws 782 (codified as amended at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12, § 573).

35

Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings
Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier
Beaches, 19 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 55-56 (1995) (describing the case as the “only . . . instance in
which an assertion of public trust authority has been declared unconstitutional”).
36

Bell, 557 A.2d at 169, 190–91.

37

Id. at 174.

38

See 1985 Me. Laws 782 (codified as amended at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. 12, § 573); Opinion of the
Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 563 (Mass. 1974).

39

See cases cited supra note 9.

40

Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). The court did not address
the extent of this reasonable access over private property. Id. at 369 (“All we decide here is that
private land is not immune from a possible right of access to the foreshore for swimming or
bathing purposes, nor is it immune from the possibility that some of the dry sand may be used by
the public incidental to the right of bathing and swimming.”); Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780
S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015); State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 678 (Or. 1969).
41

Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983); Thornton, 462 P.2d at 673.
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Hawaii,42 and much of the East Coast,43 Massachusetts and Maine remain trapped
by a city ordinance passed prior to the ratification of the Constitution.44
I argue that state legislatures in Massachusetts, Maine, and other coastal states
may expand the public’s beach access rights without constituting a taking.
Specifically, this Article shows that legislation granting the public the right to use
the land below the mean high tide line for general recreation would not be an
unconstitutional taking because it reflects a background principle of state law.45
I I . L E G I S L A T I ON P E R MI T T I N G P U B L I C A C C E S S F O R G E N E R A L
R E C R E A T I ON B E L OW T H E ME A N H I G H T I D E L I N E WOU L D N OT
C ON S T I T U T E A T A K I N G

The Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from forcing “some people
alone to bear public burdens, which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by

42

In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76 (Haw. 1968).

43

Matthews, 471 A.2d at 369; Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 195; Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, 1997
WL 1098081, at *9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 10, 1997).
44

See Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974).

45

This Article only addresses the question of whether expansion of public beach access should
be precluded from takings inquiry altogether because it falls within a background principle of
state law. This Article does not consider whether such legislation would constitute a categorical
physical invasion taking or whether it should instead be analyzed under the more lenient Penn
Central test. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978).
Many scholars and jurists believe that the application of per se rules in takings jurisprudence is
unhelpful and counterproductive. Andrea Peterson has argued that courts should not, and in fact
have not, actually treated cases involving physical invasion as per se takings without considering
the purpose of the government’s actions. Andrea L. Peterson, The False Dichotomy Between Physical
and Regulatory Takings Analysis: A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra’s Distinction Between Physical and
Regulatory Takings, 34 Ecology L.Q. 381 (2007); see also Joseph William Singer, Justifying Regulatory
Takings, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 601, 633 (2015) (“[T]he so-called categorical or per se takings are merely
applications of the three [Penn Central] factors); id. at 661 (arguing that courts should and do
consider the justifications for the government’s action when determining whether compensation
is required). For examples of justices applying ad hoc balancing rather than per se treatment, see
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reiterating her view
that Penn Central is the appropriate method of analyzing takings claims rather than adoption of
per se rules); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing Penn Central). For analysis of the Massachusetts and Maine legislation under the
traditional takings rubric, see Sharon M. P. Nicholls, Note, Public Right of Passage Along the
Massachusetts Coast: An Argument for Implementation Without Compensation, 4 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 113,
114, 128–29 (1994) (arguing that the legislation should not be considered a per se taking because it
is not a “new” physical invasion).
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the public as a whole.”46 The United States Supreme Court has “resist[ed] the
temptation to adopt per se rules”47 in this area, and has instead considered a holistic,
multifactor approach to determine whether a regulation “goes too far.”48 Under the
test announced in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,49 a court should
consider the economic impact of the regulation, the regulation’s interference with
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.50 In
some cases, a single factor can reach such an “extreme form” that it is not only
important, but determinative.51 Such “categorical takings” are limited to instances
in which a regulation imposes a “permanent physical occupation,”52 or “denies all
economically beneficial . . . use of land.”53
In holding that the denial of all economic use is a categorical taking, the Court
also acknowledged a limitation to such claims. The Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council54 recognized that a regulation is not an unconstitutional taking if it
prohibits a use that is already proscribable by “background principles of the State’s
law of property . . . .”55
Thus, “the Lucas decision fundamentally revised all takings analysis by making
the nature of the landowner’s property rights a threshold issue in every case.”56 The
“background principles of state law” question has therefore developed into a
categorical rule, which can bar otherwise valid takings claims.57
Based on this “background principles” defense, legislation expanding the
46

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).

47

Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002).

48

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

49

438 U.S. 104, 123–25 (1978).

50

Id. at 124; see, e.g., Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the Penn
Central test).
51

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).

52

Id.

53

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1019 (1992); Michael C. Blumm & Lucus
Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 321, 321 (2005) (“Justice Scalia’s opinion [in Lucas] . . . declared that a
regulation depriving a landowner of all economic value was a categorical constitutional taking of
private property for public use requiring government compensation regardless of the public
purpose served by the regulation.”).
54

505 U.S. 1003 (1992).

55

Id. at 1029.

56

Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 322.

57

See id. at 327–28.
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public’s rights to include recreation would not be a taking requiring compensation.
First, section A introduces the concept of background principles that can serve as a
defense to a takings claim and demonstrate that the public trust doctrine is an
example of such a background principle. Second, section B argues that legislation
may reflect a background principle even if it announces a rule not yet adopted as a
matter of state common law. Finally, section C argues that legislative expansion of
the public rights to include recreational use below the mean high tide line is a valid
application of the public trust doctrine as a background principle. In doing so, I
provide methods by which a future legislature could craft a law that will comport
with reasonable applications of relevant precedent and also create broad public
access rights.
A.

The Public Trust Doctrine Is a Background Principle of State Law

The State regulation is not a taking if it reflects a preexisting limitation that
merely duplicates the result that could have been achieved by the courts pursuant to
a background principle of state law.58 Legislation that reflects a background
principle cannot be a taking of property because the prohibited use was never a stick
in the owner’s bundle of rights in the first place.59 Instead, such a limitation is
merely one that “inhere[s] in the title itself.”60
While the background principles formulation first appeared in Lucas, it is not a
new concept in takings jurisprudence.61 Rather, it is rooted in the “noxious use
doctrine,” or “nuisance exception,” which has existed as long as regulatory takings
themselves.62 In 1887, the Court in Mugler v. Kansas63 upheld regulations prohibiting
alcohol production, holding that state action does not constitute a taking when it
imposes a “prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are
declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the
community . . . .”64 Thus, the nuisance exception ensured that states would be able
to exercise their police powers without being required to compensate any
58

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.

59

Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 325.

60

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.

61

See id. at 1047–50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing history of “noxious use” doctrine and
collecting cases).
62

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is recognized as the birth of regulatory takings; see
also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1047–50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 325
n.24.
63

123 U.S. 623 (1887).

64

Id. at 668.
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landowner whose interests were adversely affected.65
The Court in Lucas did not accept South Carolina’s application of the “noxious
use” doctrine, but affirmed the doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings with the
background principles exception.66 Thus, the long-recognized concept that the
regulatory takings doctrine “does not immunize owners from the rule of law or
democratic governance”67 was reaffirmed in Lucas, not rejected. If anything, Lucas
arguably broadened the concept because background principles, unlike the
nuisance exception, apply to government action that is benefit-conferring as well as
harm-preventing.68
State courts have recognized a variety of property law concepts as background
principles that preclude regulatory takings claims, including the natural use
doctrine,69 custom,70 water rights,71 and the wildlife trust.72 The public trust
doctrine has been applied as a background principle by courts in Massachusetts,73
the Supreme Court of South Carolina,74 the Ninth Circuit,75 and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.76
65

Id. at 667–68.

66

See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 333 (arguing that the “background principles” defense
is actually more protective of governmental action because it is (1) analyzed prior to the merits of
the takings claim and (2) “not limited to harm-preventing . . . restrictions”); Richard J. Lazarus,
Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1411, 1426 (1993) (“The Court engaged in a shell
game by pointedly rejecting a ‘noxious’ or ‘harmful use’ exception to the Takings Clause, only to
adopt its analytical equivalent dubbed ‘background principles of nuisance and property law.’”).

67

Singer, supra note 45, at 608.

68

See Carol Necole Brown, The Categorical Lucas Rule and the Nuisance and Background Principles
Exception, 30 Tauro L. Rev. 349, 359 (2014); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 333; Lazarus, supra
note 66, at 1426.
69

See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Wis. 1972); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53,
at 344.

70

See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456–57 (Or. 1993); Blumm & Ritchie, supra
note 53, at 347.

71

See W. Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171, 1180 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001); Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 350.

72

See State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 28, 84 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Blumm &
Ritchie, supra note 53, at 352.
73

See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 583 N.E.2d 894, 901 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).

74

See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003).

75

See Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying
Washington law).
76

See R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Wis. 2001).
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The public trust doctrine is a quintessential background principle of state law.77
Conveyance of trust property is made “subject to the right of the public.”78 The jus
publicum cannot be alienated from public trust property, and title to such property
is therefore “different in character [than ordinary land].”79 The foundational
premise of the public trust doctrine is that the right to exclude the public from using
the property for its benefit was never a stick in the owner’s bundle of rights.80 Thus,
it is a quality that “inhere[s] in the title itself.”81
Further, states have been given great latitude in defining background
principles.82 While federal courts could theoretically limit what may serve as a
background principle as a matter of federal constitutional law, the inquiry is so
intertwined with quintessential state law issues that close scrutiny would offend
our notions of federalism.83 Moreover, given the pronouncement that “states have
the power to define the limits of the land held in public trust,”84 it is unlikely that the
Court would review and reject a state’s interpretation of the public trust doctrine as
a background principle of state law.85
B.

Background Principles Can Evolve Over Time

The background principles defense protects legislation prohibiting conduct
that “was always unlawful.”86 Laws that proscribe uses already prohibited by state

77

See, e.g., Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 341–42.

78

Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972).

79

Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).

80

See id.; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 341–42.

81

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).

82

See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 364–65.

83

See id.at 364-65 (discussing federalism concerns relating to federal resolution of “background
principles”); see also Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1430 (noting that the background principles’ focus
on state property and tort law could lead federal courts to abstain from considering the issue).
84

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988).

85

The Court has repeatedly refused to grant certiorari to review the “background principles”
issue. Over Justice Scalia’s dissent, the Court refused to review Oregon’s application of custom as
a “background principle” to reject a takings claim. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S.
1207, 1209–14 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The Oregon Supreme Court
had rejected a takings challenge to the state’s denial of a building permit that would have
interfered with the public’s customary right to access the beach. See Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 450–51 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207; see also Blumm & Ritchie, supra
note 53, at 347–49 (discussing the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Stevens).

86

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
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law cannot be takings because, simply put, nothing was taken; the legislature is
merely “duplicat[ing] the result that could have been achieved in the courts—by
adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate [public]
nuisances . . . .”87
However, this does not mean that the legislature can pass laws based in
background principles only in ways that have been explicitly resolved by the
common law.88 Rather, making “implications of those background principles . . .
explicit”89 necessarily involves a level of interpretation by the legislature of what
those background principles entail. Thus, in Lucas, the Court held that a state is free
to apply a background principle to meet contemporary needs as long as the
application is “objectively reasonable.”90
Giving guidance in this area, Justice Scalia explained that background
principles include instances in which “changed circumstances or new knowledge . .
. make what was previously permissible no longer so.”91 As an example, he explained
that “the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to
remove all improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits astride an
earthquake fault,” would not be entitled to compensation.92 Thus, “new knowledge”
about a fault line would allow the government to physically invade the property, to
deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use, to condemn the plant, or to do
anything else it may choose to do to prevent the harm.93 Clearly, background
principles of state law are not static, but can be adapted to suit modern needs.
Again, this is not a new concept in takings jurisprudence. In finding zoning
restrictions constitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1926 consulted the law of
nuisance “not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its
analogies.”94 As Professor Humbach has stated:
Indeed, no such narrow reading of state legislatures’ land-use powers, limiting
them to re-enacting the common law of nuisance, is supported by precedent. . . . The
87

Id. at 1029; see, e.g., M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding
that prohibition on plaintiff’s mining rights was not a taking because plaintiffs “never acquired
the right to mine in such a way as to endanger the public health and safety”).

88

See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030–31; Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 343.

89

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.

90

Id. at 1032 n.18.

91

Id. at 1031.

92

Id. at 1029.

93

See id. at 1029, 1031.

94

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926).
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Court has plainly acknowledged that legislatures have greater power by using language
such as “akin to a public nuisance” and “nuisance-like” to describe [the] kinds of land
uses a legislature may restrict . . . . Even more to the point, the Court has consistently
upheld legislatures’ power to restrict a wide variety of undesirable uses and activities
not considered nuisances at common law . . . .95

Thus, legislatures may draw on common law principles to regulate a wide range
of conduct pursuant to their police powers.96 The development of nuisance law has
been described as a “functional dialogue” between the legislature and judiciary.97
Because “property law has always been functional, encouraging behavior
compatible with contemporary goals of the economy,”98 it is logical that property
law has developed through similar “interplay”99 between legislative and judicial
action.
Just as courts have recognized that legislatures are empowered to prohibit
“nuisance-like”100 conduct, courts also have recognized that states may exercise
their police powers by drawing upon public trust principles.101 For example, the
New Jersey legislature expanded and codified the holdings of the New Jersey
Supreme Court in a series of regulations granting expansive public access to the
shoreline.102 Similarly, North Carolina has stated that the legislature may “modify
any prior common law understanding of the geographic limits of the[] public trust

95
John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 Colum. J. Envtl.
L. 1, 8–9 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
96

See id. at 17–18 (discussing history of statutory nuisances and their ability to meet changing
conditions).

97

Babcock, supra note 35, at 22 n.113 (citing Memorandum from Professor Zygmunt Plater,
Boston College Law School, to Cotton Harness, General Counsel, South Carolina Coastal Council
(Nov. 14, 1992) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review)).
98

Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 Stan. L. Rev 1433, 1447 (1993). See generally Joseph William Singer, The Rule of
Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1369, 1425 (2013).
99

Babcock, supra note 35, at 22 n.113.

100

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987).

101

Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 595–96.

102

Id. at 594. The Public Access to Waterfront rule requires that coastal owners “provide
permanent perpendicular and linear access to the waterfront to the maximum event practical,
including both visual and physical access.” N.J. Admin. Code § 7:7E-8.11(b) (2006). The Hudson
Waterfront Walkway rule requires paved paths and walkways to provide access to the shore. N.J.
Admin. Code § 7:7E-4.38 (2006).
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rights.”103 Such legislative expansion has been upheld against takings challenges.104
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that there is more leeway in
expansive applications of background principles in areas that have been
traditionally subject to regulation by the state.105 “When takings plaintiffs bring
challenges based on property uses that have traditionally been subject to regulation,
those claims can be summarily rejected at the threshold level, albeit with
recognition . . . that ‘a law does not become a background principle . . . by enactment
itself.’”106
C.

Legislation Granting the Public the Right to Use the Intertidal Land for
General Recreation Is a Valid Application of the Evolving Background
Principles of the Public Trust Doctrine

Legislation expanding the public’s right to use the land below the high tide line
for general recreation is a valid application of a background principle of state law.
First, the legislature should be given deference in determining the best uses to
which the public may put the land it unquestionably has a right to access. In the
following section, I provide recommendations about how a legislature may
formulate such a law. Second, such legislation can be a background principle,
despite contrary holdings by the state courts. Finally, owners of land abutting the
ocean do not have reasonable, investment-backed expectations of an unfettered
right to exclude the public.
1.

Courts Should Defer to the Legislature’s Application of the Public
Trust Doctrine

Title to public trust land is held by the owner while beneficial ownership over
the land is held by the public.107 As the representative of the public, the legislature’s
determinations about the best uses of trust property are entitled to deference. A
legislative finding that public beach recreation is beneficial should not be

103

Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that legislation
authorizing the public to drive over privately owned beaches did not constitute a taking, noting
that some public access to privately owned beaches was customary in North Carolina).
104

See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354, 358 (D.N.J.
1999). But see Galt v. Montana, 731 P.2d 912, 916 (Mont. 1987) (finding unconstitutional legislation
that expanded the state’s common law rule by requiring property owners to build structures to
facilitate use of public trust lands).
105

Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 357.

106

Id. at 357 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630 (2001)).

107

See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892).
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contravened by judicial activism or reliance on a centuries-old ordinance.108
Many states have identified public recreation as a valid public trust use.109 The
New Jersey Supreme Court had “no difficulty finding that, in this latter half of the
twentieth century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient
prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend as well to recreational uses.”110
Neither have the courts of California,111 North Carolina,112 Washington,113 Rhode
Island,114 Wisconsin,115 Michigan,116 or Hawaii.117
Beach recreation has social value in the modern era that makes it worthy of
protecting with the public trust doctrine. In colonial times, fishing, fowling, and
navigation were vital for sustenance and commerce.118 Today, the primary social
value of the beach is recreation.119 The New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged
the value of recreation, noting that the “popularity for recreational uses [of the
beach] and open space are much heavier [than in the past], and their importance to
the public welfare has become much more apparent.”120
Precluding recreational use of the beach deprives a state of the profits of its
natural resources. Tourism and recreation are more commercially valuable today

108
See Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1427 (discussing Justice O’Connor’s concern with judges
intruding on legislative functions of factfinding and policymaking).
109

See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting
national trend expanding the doctrine to include recreation and collecting cases).
110

Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972).

111

Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (including “general recreation”
as valid use of trust and noting that the “public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently
flexible to encompass changing public needs” (citations omitted)).
112

Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 191 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).

113

Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 103 P.3d 203, 205–06 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).

114

Cavanaugh v. Town of Narragansett, No. WC 91-0496, 1997 WL 1098081, at *11–12 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Oct. 10, 1997) (citing R.I. Const. art. I. § 17).

115

Movrich v. Lobermeier, 889 N.W.2d 454, 465 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016).

116

Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 62, 74 (Mich. 2005) (including “pleasure” and “walking along
the lakeshore” as valid uses of trust property).

117

Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 451 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009).

118

See Fernandez, supra note 2, at 628–29.

119

See, e.g., id. at 625–26 (noting that “maritime commerce no longer reigns as the most valuable
or common use of the coast”); Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 589. See generally Catherine
Robinson Hall, Dockominiums: In Conflict with the Public Trust Doctrine, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 331, 331
(1990) (discussing the increase in recreational boating in the United States).
120

Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53 (N.J. 1972).
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than are near-shore fishing and hunting.121 As one commenter noted, “the modern
economic equivalent of the fishing net may be the beach blanket.”122
Other than its instrumental value as a driver of commercial business, beach
recreation also has independent social value. Scholars have argued that historically,
commerce was a valuable activity not only because it led to prosperity, but also
because it fostered empathy and multicultural socialization.123 Professor Rose
asserts that in the modern age, public recreation serves a similar socializing
function.124 “Insofar as recreation educates and socializes us, it acts as a ‘social glue’
for everyone, not just those immediately engaged . . . . Like commerce, then,
recreation has social and political overtones.”125
The equalizing function of beach recreation is best served if the state provides
public access and prevents monopolization of the communal resource.126
Beachfront property is in high demand, and its rising value could lead to increased
commodification.127 The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated: “[t]he public
demand for beaches has increased with the growth of population and improvement
of transportation facilities. Furthermore, the projected demand for salt water
swimming will not be met ‘unless the existing swimming capacities . . . are
expanded.’”128
The rule announced by the Massachusetts and Maine courts would allow these
states to sell their public beaches, and their citizens would be left with no right to
121

Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 589.

122

Id.

123

Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 711, 775 (1986). Professor Sax has similarly argued that a conceptual underpinning of
the public trust doctrine is that some interests are so “intrinsically important to every citizen that
their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather than of serfs.” Sax, supra
note 1, at 484.
124

Rose, supra note 123, at 775.

125

Id. at 778, 779–80.

126

Id. at 774 (defining “inherently public” property as property that is (1) “physically capable of
monopolization” and (2) “most valuable when used by . . . the public at large”).
127

See Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 53 (N.J. 1972) (“Remaining tidal water
resources still in the ownership of the State are becoming very scarce, demands upon them by
reason of increased population, industrial development and their popularity for recreational uses
and open spaces are much heavier, and their importance to the public welfare has become more
apparent.”); Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1424 (discussing the rapid and significant increase in price
of beach property and noting that this illustrates the “increasingly commercial nature of real
property”).
128

Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984).
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engage in beach recreation.129 It is a bleak prospect if a state legislature may divest
the entire seashore to private developers and transform public trust property into a
high-priced resort.130 The public would likely find little solace in its remaining right
to engage in “fowling.”
Professor Sax has argued that certain property interests are “the gifts of
nature’s bounty” and therefore ought to be reserved for the public.131 Sandy beach
is a scarce resource, available in only a limited number of states.132 It is the gateway
between the land and sea, where our ancestors once emerged from the oceans onto
the land.133 And it is particularly well suited to recreation.134 While citizens in the
past may have appreciated this natural resource by fishing and boating, the modern
beach user simply wishes to walk on the beach, sit in the sand, and look over the
ocean.
To achieve the social benefits of beach recreation, the public must be
guaranteed the reasonable use of some land above the low tide line.135 If the
“modern . . . equivalent of the fishing net [is] the beach blanket,”136 the public should
be given a place to put the blanket down. Just as legislatures can regulate “nuisancelike”137 conduct, so too should they be able to grant “fishing-like” benefits.
As indicated, states are given more leeway applying background principles in
areas that have been traditionally subject to regulation by the state.138 The public
trust doctrine has imposed limits on private ownership of this land since colonial
times.139 The legislatures in Maine and Massachusetts could use these existing
restrictions to expand public access.
129

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1974).

130

Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364.

131

Sax, supra note 1, at 484.

132

Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364.

133

Many scientists believe that life began in the ocean. See, e.g., J.B. Corliss et al., An
Hypothesis Concerning the Relationship Between Submarine Hot Springs and the Origin of Life
on Earth, Oceanologica Acta 59 (1981); Leslie E. Orgel, The Origin of Life on Earth, 271 Sci. Am. 76
(1994).
134

Matthews, 471 A.2d at 364 (“Oceanfront property is uniquely suitable for bathing and other
recreational activities.” (quoting Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass’n, 430 A.2d 881, 886 (N.J.
1981))).

135

Id.

136

Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 589.

137

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 n.20 (1987).

138

See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at 357.

139

See Storer v. Freeman, 5 Mass. 435, 438 (1810). See generally Fernandez, supra note 2.
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First, legislation could grant a right to recreational access and base that right
explicitly in public trust principles. The proposed Act in Massachusetts provided
only for an “on-foot right-of-way,” which was not tethered specifically to the
existing public access rights.140 A future legislature could explicitly draw upon the
public trust principles, explain its understanding of the needs of the public, and
create substantive rules applying those principles to those needs.
Second, legislation could grant recreational access rights grounded in a broad
interpretation of the traditional uses. For example, legislation could provide a
public right to use the intertidal land for “aesthetic enjoyment of fish, fowl, and all
other manner of wildlife, as well as the natural environment in which they inhabit.”
Legislation could similarly provide a right of access for “navigation, including
recreational on-foot navigation of the intertidal land itself, and all uses of the
intertidal land ancillary to this navigation.” The Maine SJC’s recent expansive
reading of “navigation”141 indicates that this approach has potential to provide the
desired public rights while satisfying concerns about past precedent and unfairness
to property owners.
To survive a takings challenge, the legislature should be explicit about the
correlation between the modern right of recreation and the past rights of fishing,
fowling, and navigation. The legislature should conduct legislative factfinding
about the most valuable modern use of the trust property. More importantly, the
legislature should conduct a historical inquiry into the traditional trust uses and
explain how these public recreational rights derive from the same underlying
principles.
Armed with these doctrinal hooks, judges considering the constitutionality of
such legislation should feel confident deferring to legislative findings. By
demonstrating that the right to access this land derives from the existing rights of
the public, courts could comfortably hold that this reflects a background principle
of state law and is thus immune from further takings inquiry.
2. Recreational Use Is a Valid Application of Background Principles
Despite Contrary Precedent
Expanding trust uses to include recreation is a valid application of background

140

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974).

141

See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992); McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d
620, 636 (Me. 2011) (Saufley, C.J., concurring); Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54
(N.J. 1972).
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principles of state law despite the rulings in the Opinion of the Justices142 and Bell.143
While the Maine SJC in Bell held that there is no general recreational easement to
the intertidal land as a matter of common law,144 such an easement can still be a
background principle.
As a threshold matter, neither court analyzed the public right in light of the
public trust doctrine.145 The courts analyzed the question by interpreting the
ordinance and therefore failed to recognize that the public had preexisting common
law rights.146 To the extent that the rights and limits on intertidal ownership are
creatures of legislation, the legislature should be permitted to clarify or correct any
judicial interpretation.147
More importantly, the courts’ rejection of the argument that the public had a
general recreational easement forty years ago does not foreclose future
development of the background principle. Background principles may expand in
the face of changed circumstances and new knowledge.148 “The public trust
doctrine, like all common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static,
but should be molded and extended to meet . . . the needs of the public it was created
to benefit.”149
The Maine SJC has, in fact, continued to interpret and expand upon the public’s

142

313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974).

143

557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).

144

Id. at 174. The Advisory Opinion did not separately address whether there was a common law
public easement.

145

See id.; Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561.

146

See Bell, 557 A.2d at 174 (“[A]ll the cases in Massachusetts and Maine recognizing the common
law principles of intertidal property interests read the Colonial Ordinance as having restricted the
reserved public easement to fishing, fowling, and navigation and related uses.”).
147

Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 71 (1851). Massachusetts courts have generally not
interpreted the rights as legislative. The SJC has stated that the ordinance created “a legal right
and vested interest in the soil, and not a mere permissive indulgence, or gratuitous license, given
without consideration, and to be revoked and annulled at the pleasure of those who gave it.” Id.

148

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992). Although Justice Scalia’s examples
of “changed circumstances” are impending disasters, “background principles” can apply to laws
that are benefit-conferring as well as harm-preventing. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53, at
332-33; Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1428. The most obvious “changed circumstance” relating to a
benefit-conferring law would likely be a change in the needs of the beneficiaries.

149

Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972). As Blumm and Ritchie point out,
“[t]he public trust is surely no exception to [Lucas’s] acknowledgment” that “background principles
may have the potential to evolve beyond their historical scope.” Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 53,
at 343.
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access rights since Bell. In McGarvey v. Whittredge,150 the court held that the public
has the right to cross the intertidal land for the purposes of scuba diving.151 In a split
opinion, three justices would have held that the public trust doctrine in fact does
grant the public the right to access the intertidal land for uses beyond fishing,
fowling, and navigation.152 Chief Justice Saufley acknowledged the need for
ongoing development of this area of law:
The common law, with “its flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation,” has
continually evolved to reflect the realities of a changing world. As this unique body of
common law has developed, generations of jurists have searched for a basic set of
principles to govern the ownership and use of the intertidal land.153

The remainder of the panel concurred in the result, but maintained that the
public rights were limited to the traditional categories.154 However, those justices
held that scuba diving fell within a broad reading of “navigation.”155 Either way, the
holding in McGarvey demonstrates that public access rights in Maine are not static,
and seriously undercuts the precedential value of Bell.
Legislatures and courts should be permitted to fix doctrinal imperfections in
the common law. The New Jersey legislature has “codified and expanded” the
holdings of the New Jersey Supreme Court by codifying public right-of-ways to
provide beach access.156 A North Carolina court has recently held that the legislature
may “modify any prior common law understanding of the geographic limits of the[]
public trust rights.”157
Further, there are reasons that these state courts should reexamine the
reasoning of some past opinions delineating the rights of the public. As a matter of
statutory interpretation, the Massachusetts SJC ordinarily applies a presumption
against alienation of trust property in a manner that lessens public uses.158 Instead,
150

28 A.3d 620 (Me. 2011).

151

Id. at 636 (Saufley, C.J., concurring).

152

Id. at 635.

153

Id. at 624 (citation omitted) (quoting Pendexter v. Pendexter, 363 A.2d 743, 749 (Me. 1976)).

154

Id. at 642 (Levy, J., concurring).

155

Id.

156

Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 594.

157

Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).

158

See Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm’n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 126 (Mass. 1966) (narrowly
construing a grant of public land to private entity that “seem[ed], in part at least, a commercial
venture for private profit” and inconsistent with public uses); see also Sax, supra note 1, at 494
(discussing Gould and the SJC’s skepticism towards questionable diversions of trust property into
private hands).
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courts have repeatedly construed the ordinance narrowly against the state, first by
finding the express public rights to be exhaustive,159 and in Massachusetts, by
interpreting those rights narrowly.160 This interpretation is particularly unusual
because grants from the government to private individuals should be construed
against the grantee.161
Courts should apply a corollary presumption in favor of legislation, like the
Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act and the proposed Massachusetts law, which
furthers the purpose of the trust property.162 Instead, the courts gave no deference
to the legislatures’ determinations about the best uses of public trust property.163
The attempt to constitutionalize a colonial ordinance forty years ago should not
dissuade the Massachusetts and Maine legislatures from enacting laws to bring the
public’s access rights into conformity with modern needs. The holding in Bell has
already been significantly undercut by judicial expansion of public access rights in
McGarvey. The Massachusetts opinion is a mere advisory opinion, and the
legislature is in no way restrained from passing the law and giving the SJC a more
adequate basis for the legislation.164
Many of the cases cited in the Opinion of the Justices165 are more than one hundred

159

See, e.g., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 174 (Me. 1989); Wellfleet v. Glaze, 525 N.E.2d 1298,
1302–05 (Mass. 1988); Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974).
160

See Wellfleet, 525 N.E.2d at 1302–05 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (finding that “[a]quaculture is
not fishing, nor can it legitimately be considered a ‘natural derivative’ of the right to fish”).

161

See, e.g., Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
420, 548–49 (1837) (applying canon that grants made by the government to individuals be
construed against the grantee); Bos. Elevated Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 39 N.E.2d 87, 113 (Mass.
1942) (holding that when the government makes a grant to a citizen, it will be construed against
the grantee). The ordinance is the type of grant that the SJC would usually review with suspicion
as one that effectuates a handout of public property to private landowners in contravention of
public purposes. See Sax, supra note 1, at 494.
162

See Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 406 (1842) (requiring clear statement for
state divestment of trust property); Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep’t. of Health and Envtl.
Control, 766 S.E.2d 707, 721–23 (S.C. 2014) (considering public trust principles in interpreting
regulations); Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A
Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 Envtl. L. 573, 578–79 (1989) (identifying “rule of
construction” as a proper use of the public trust doctrine).
163

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 565–68.

164

See Opinion of the Justices, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1106 (Mass. 1981) (“[A]nything we say as to the
construction of the statute would in no way affect the power of the Legislature to pass any bill it
sees fit to pass, or to declare the bill’s intended meaning, within the limits of the Constitution.”).

165

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d at 566.
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years old.166 Fishing, fowling, and navigation may have been an appropriate,
exhaustive list at the time.167 These older opinions were also interpreting the
ordinance without clarification from the modern legislature. Future legislation
could make explicit findings regarding the value of public recreation, concerns
about commodification of beachfront property, and the conceptual similarity
between recreation and the traditional trust uses.168
That the state law has put its imprimatur on an opposite interpretation does
not preclude it from becoming a background principle.169 Courts can distinguish
and interpret these past cases in ways that are “objectively reasonable”170 in light of
social change and new legislation. Thus, future legislation expanding permissible
trust uses to include recreation could reflect a “background principle of state law”
even in the face of contrary precedent.
3.

Beachfront Property Owners Do Not Have a Reasonable
Expectation to Unilaterally Exclude the Public

Beachfront property owners do not have a reasonable expectation to exclude
the public from the intertidal land.171 The public unquestionably has the right to
access this land for certain uses.172 Landowners purchased this land subject to a
preexisting public trust. They cannot have a reasonable expectation that this
amorphous, pre-constitutional public right of access will become frozen in time at
166

See, e.g., Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422 (1909); Butler v. Attorney
Gen., 80 N.E. 688 (Mass. 1907); Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 66 (1851).
167

While a long common law tradition could ordinarily make it more difficult to justify a change
in the law, many of these cases were decided before the rise in beach recreation as its predominant
use. See Mulvaney & Weeks, supra note 1, at 587–88.
168

See supra notes 110–30 and accompanying text.

169

See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 102 Fed. Cl. 443, 456 (2011) (holding that owner
of water rights could not rely on an “absence of contrary finding” by the state courts to claim its
use was lawful, and noting that the “public trust and reasonable use doctrines are self-executing,
as well as evolving, and do not therefore lend themselves to such a static interpretation”).

170

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1032 n.18 (1992).

171

While “reasonable, investment-backed expectations” are traditionally analyzed as a factor in
the Penn Central test, the inquiry is similarly appropriate while considering whether legislation is
a “background principle” of state law. The Court recently addressed the “denominator question,”
in which a court considering a takings challenge must first identify the proper “unit of property
against which to assess the effect of the challenged governmental action.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137
S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017). To determine the “denominator,” courts must consider, among other
things, the “reasonable expectations of an acquirer of land.” Id. at 1945–46.

172

See Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 172–73 (Me. 1989); Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438
(1810).
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the instant that they acquire title to the property.173 This is particularly true in light
of the general trend expanding beach access rights in Maine and across the
country.174
It would certainly be improper for a legislature to grant a public recreational
easement over private property without providing compensation as a matter of
course. Landowners have reasonable expectations that the legislature will not do
so. But this is not ordinary property.
First, the public already has the right to use the property for certain purposes.
Therefore, any concern that allowing public recreation would give legislators carte
blanche to designate public easements is misplaced; such a rule would be limited to
the incredibly narrow situation in which the public has broad, preexisting access
rights.
Second, the land in question is unique. Sandy intertidal land abutting the
ocean is a limited resource well suited to public recreation.175 States are entitled
greater latitude in the regulation of natural resource-land than other similar
property, and homeowners are aware of this latitude.176
Third, the existing public rights demonstrate that recreational uses will not
contravene landowners’ reasonable expectations. General recreation is not
materially different than fishing, fowling, or navigation from the perspective of the
landowner. It is hardly defensible to say that a homeowner invests with the
“reasonable expectation” that she will look from her window and see someone

173

S. W. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 212 P.3d 1, 7 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2008) (“Landowners whose property adjoins a natural watercourse assume the burden of the
location they have chosen.”).
174

It is true that not all states are expanding beach access rights. However, the debate usually
involves whether the public may access the dry sand, not whether it may engage in certain
activities in the wet sand. See generally Erika Kranz, Sand for the People: The Continuing Controversy
Over Public Access to Florida’s Beaches, 83 Fla. B.J. 11 (2009).

175
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 364 (N.J. 1984) (“Oceanfront property
is uniquely suitable for bathing and other recreational activities.” (quoting Lusardi v. Curtis Point
Prop. Owners Ass’n, 430 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1981))).
176

Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Coastal
property may present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further
in regulating its development and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise
permit.”); see Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945–46 (2017) (“[I]t may be relevant that the
property is located in an area that is subject to, or likely be subject to, environmental or other
regulation.”); Lazarus, supra note 66, at 1422 (“[T]he fragile, ever-shifting ground near the
shoreline is not like most places.”).
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walking with a fishing pole and a cooler, but not a book and a blanket.177 It is unlikely
that Maine homeowners invest with the expectation that they will allow access to
beachgoers in scuba suits, but not bathing suits.178
Fourth, public rights such as the public trust doctrine are flexible. These public
rights may be expanded to meet modern needs,179 and the rights of individual
owners are subject to limitations in the face of such changes.180 For example, the
public has always had rights related to commerce and navigation, but these were
extended to apply to navigable airspace.181 The U.S. Supreme Court stated that, “[t]o
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously
interfere with their control and development in the public interest, and transfer
into private ownership that to which only the public has a claim.”182
Fifth, there is a legal trend toward the expansion of recreational beach access.
In Good v. United States,183 the Federal Circuit rejected a takings claim brought by a
developer who had been denied a permit to build on wetlands.184 Because “rising
environmental awareness translated into ever-tightening land use restrictions,”
and because the owner “was not oblivious to this trend,” the court found that he had
no reasonable investment-backed expectations to be able to build.185 Thus, his
takings claim was denied despite the fact that he was unable to pursue any
economically viable development project.186
Similarly, it is hard to imagine that Massachusetts and Maine shoreline-

177

See Fernandez, supra note 2, at 636 n.84 (“[A] hiker that carries a fishing rod could proceed
unto the same property that would be closed to her if the fishing rod were missing.”).

178

See McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 620, 635–37 (Me. 2011) (finding a right to use intertidal
land for purposes of scuba diving).
179

U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1946).

180

Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566 (Mass. 1974) (“It has been held proper to interfere
with the private property rights of coastal owners in the tidal area for purposes reasonably related
to the protection or promotion of fishing or navigation without paying compensation.”).

181

See Causby, 328 U.S. at 264 (“We have said that the airspace is a public highway.”).

182

Id. at 261; Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1206, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“‘[B]ackground principles’ of long-standing federal property law indicate that there is no private
property right in the navigable airspace of the United States.”).
183

189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

184

Id. at 1357–58, 1363.

185

Id. at 1362.

186

Id. at 1362–63.
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property holders are “oblivious”187 to the anomalous nature of their state laws. As
indicated, coastal states have generally expanded the rights of the public to include
recreation.188 Many states retain the traditional high tide line,189 but others have
gone further and increased the physical scope of the publicly available land. New
Jersey has used the public trust doctrine to expand the scope of the trust to include
all municipally owned dry sand beach.190 That right was later extended to apply to
privately owned dry sand beach whenever it is necessary to provide “reasonable
access” to the wet sand.191 Other states, such as North Carolina192 and Oregon,193
have similarly extended public access to include dry sand beaches using the doctrine
of custom. Hawaii, relying on traditional Hawaiian principles, extends public
rights to the brush line.194
While knowledge of a legal trend is not itself determinative,195 social awareness
of national trends is relevant in determining a party’s reasonable expectations.196
The fact that Maine law has in fact continued to evolve in this area emphasizes the
landowners’ lack of expectations that the public’s rights are static.197
187

Cf. id. at 1362 (suggesting that defendant must have been aware of trend toward stricter land
use laws).

188

See supra notes 102–09 and accompanying text.

189

See, e.g., Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 564 n.17 (Conn. 2001) (noting that public
trust allows the public to access land between the mean high tide line and the water); McQueen v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119–20 (S.C. 2003) (“The State has the exclusive right to control
land below the high water mark for the public benefit.”).
190

See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (citing Neptune
City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54 (N.J. 1972)) (“In Avon we held that the public trust applied
to the municipally owned dry sand beach immediately landward of the high water mark.”).
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Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365–66. The court did not address the extent of this reasonable access
over private property. Id. at 369 (“All we decide here is that private land is not immune from a
possible right of access to the foreshore for swimming or bathing purposes, nor is it immune from
the possibility that some of the dry sand may be used by the public incidental to the right of
bathing and swimming.”).
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Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 195–96 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015).
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State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 677–78 (Or. 1969).
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In re Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968).
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See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 629–30 (2001).
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See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034–35 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Property is bought and sold, investments are made, subject to the State’s power to regulate . . . .
The expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective rules and customs that can
be understood as reasonable by all parties involved.”).
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See McGarvey v. Whittredge, 28 A.3d 260, 624 (Me. 2011).
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Finally, the owners’ expectations should be considered against the backdrop of
a property interest that is in constant flux even without the public trust doctrine.
The natural high tide and low tide lines regularly shift as a function of natural
erosion, intentional human intervention, and a combination thereof.198 Title to
previously dry land that becomes submerged or intertidal transfers automatically to
the state if it is the result of certain forms of natural erosion.199 Generally, new sandy
beachfront that is created by a rapid process belongs to the state, whether it occurs
by natural causes or a state-funded sand nourishment project.200 Regardless of the
strict approach taken as to this issue in Massachusetts,201 beachfront owners
acquire property with the knowledge that the exact scope of their property interest
is subject to change.
Given the broad national trend toward recreational beach access, the ephemeral
nature of beach property itself, and Maine’s continued expansion of public rights,
intertidal land owners do not have a reasonable expectation in the unfettered right
to exclude the public from the beach.
CONCLUSION

The courts and legislatures of Maine and Massachusetts should not be bound
by their predecessors in determining the scope of public rights. The land between
the high and low tide lines is held by the landowners for the benefit of the public. As
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Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 191 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (“None of these natural
lines of demarcation are static, as the beaches are continually changing due to erosion or accretion
of stand, whether through the forces of nature or through human intervention.”); Lazarus, supra
note 66, at 1422.
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Nies, 780 S.E.2d at 191 (noting that the State acquires ownership of public trust in dry sand
beaches if they are created through public-funded beach nourishment projects); see Coburg Dairy,
Inc. v. Lesser, 458 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. 1995) (holding that wetlands created by the encroachment of
navigable tidal water belong to the State); TH Investments, Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, L.P., 217
S.W.3d 173, 196 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding that submersion of land transferred title from private to
state ownership, and that this transfer did not constitute a taking).
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See Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 709 (2010)
(“[F]ormerly submerged land that has become dry land by avulsion continues to belong to the
owner of the seabed (usually the State).”). The Massachusetts SJC has applied the opposite rule
and held that title to previously submerged land that was converted into a sandy beach by the state
for purposes of creating a public beach vested in the abutting landowner. Michaelson v. Silver
Beach Improvement Ass’n, 173 N.E.2d 273, 277–78 (Mass. 1961). That holding is anomalous and
represents clear judicial activism that transferred land that was literally created by the state for
the benefit of the public into private ownership.
201

Michaelson, 173 N.E.2d at 277–78.
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the representative of public will, the legislature is entitled to deference as to the best
uses of the public’s trust property.
Aside from democratic principles, practical considerations of modern life
counsel toward expanding the permissible public uses of intertidal land. To meet
the changed circumstances of modern life, the legislature should be permitted to
codify the background public trust principles into clearly defined substantive rules.
The area between land and sea is of historic significance, which is why it has always
been treated as special by the common law. Modern society should be empowered
to use this unique and beneficial property in ways that are best suited to its needs.
These goals are not merely aspirational, but achievable. By explicitly basing
legislation on the analogy to the public’s preexisting access rights, by defining
recreational rights in terms of the traditional trust uses, and by engaging in
legislative factfinding about the need for this modification, a legislature could
present courts with a fuller understanding of why the right is necessary. Armed
with such legislation, the Maine and Massachusetts courts could find that, in fact,
the public has the right to enjoy the beach after all.
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